نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار گروه حقوق عمومی و بینالملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه مازندران، مازندران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The Constitution is a set of higher-order norms concerning the organization of power, the limits of the jurisdiction of public institutions, and the protection of fundamental rights, while constitutional law is the field of knowledge that examines these norms, the institutions responsible for their implementation, and the methods of their interpretation and protection. This article addresses the role of social, scientific, historical, and economic facts in the application and interpretation of constitutional norms. Decisions concerning liberty, equality, security, public health, property, privacy, states of emergency, or the financial burden of laws are often based on claims concerning risk, necessity, social effects, or the feasibility of implementing a decision. The central question is under what conditions such claims acquire legal effect in determining the scope of a right, the limits of jurisdiction, or the validity of a law.
Employing conceptual analysis, historical reconstruction, and comparative study, the research first examines Davis’s distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts, and then investigates the formation of the doctrine of constitutional fact review in American constitutional law. It subsequently examines the functional equivalents of this issue in written-law systems, particularly through the principle of proportionality, the assessment of the effects of legislation, and the review of the factual bases underlying public decisions. Finally, its position in Iranian constitutional law is considered.
The findings indicate that constitutional fact should not be regarded as a third independent category alongside the two categories proposed by Davis. “Constitutional” is a functional attribute that a factual proposition acquires when its acceptance or rejection directly affects the determination of the scope of a fundamental right, the ascertainment of the limits of jurisdiction, or the validity of a law. This function is not exclusive to common-law systems; however, the avenues through which facts enter legal reasoning and the methods by which they are assessed differ across legal systems. In Iranian law, the text of the Constitution and the official interpretation referred to in Article 98 constitute normative sources, while the implementation of provisions such as Articles 75 and 79 concerning rights without assessing certain factual matters is not possible.
The conclusion is that facts play a substantive and justificatory role in the application of constitutional law, although they do not constitute an independent source for the creation of norms. Legal reasoning, insofar as it gives rise to a claim that is effective, determinate, and capable of assessment, requires its underlying basis to be made explicit and open to scrutiny. This approach can establish a balance between limiting and expanding the scope of legal decision-making without reducing it merely to political considerations or expert judgment.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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