The Political Economy of Constitutional Rules: An Examination of the Function of Constitutional Economics in Legal Studies

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Law, Baqir al Oloum University, Qom, Iran.

2 PhD., Candidate, Department of Public Law, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran

10.22081/phlq.2025.72053.1127

Abstract

Employing a descriptive–analytical method, this study seeks to clarify the position of the political economy of constitutional rules and the necessity of employing this approach in legal studies. It addresses the question of what role the political economy of constitutional rules plays within the discipline of law and how this approach may contribute to a much deeper understanding of legal structures and institutions. As an academic field, the political economy of constitutional rules, owing to its interdisciplinary character, provides enriching epistemic perspectives for legal scholars. The findings of this research indicate that this approach offers valuable contributions to legal scholarship across three domains: positive, normative, and interpretive. The positive dimension explains how laws are formed and how actors respond to them; the normative dimension evaluates laws according to value‑based criteria; and the interpretive dimension concerns the interpretation and clarification of the meaning of legal rules. The principal function of this approach lies in providing guidance for fundamental institutional change and for the reform and adjustment of existing rules in order to improve the “rules of the game.” This study further explains how the political economy of constitutional rules, through its analytical tools, is capable of identifying and predicting the behavioral consequences arising from the incentive structures embedded within constitutional rules. The approach provides a framework for normative evaluation and may play an effective and strategic role in the revision and reform of constitutional rules. It also offers a perspective through which the operation and consequences of constitutional rules may be better understood, enabling a clearer interpretation of constitutional provisions—an interpretation that may ultimately contribute to improving the institutional conditions governing political and economic spheres.The political economy of constitutional rules concerns the application of the analytical tools and methods of economics to the evaluation of fundamental rules within which legal structures and social institutions are organized and within whose framework social actions take place. This approach occupies a distinctive position at the intersection
of economics, political science, and law, and constitutes an important component of interdisciplinary studies. It also provides significant insights into issues such as public finance and economic policymaking. This article therefore seeks to explain and elaborate the importance of studying this approach within legal scholarship and to clearly delineate its functions and contributions to the field of law.

Keywords

References

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Journal of Philosophy of Law
Volume 4, Issue 2
October 2025
Pages 180-155

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  • Receive Date: 03 June 2025
  • Accept Date: 06 June 2025

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