Feasibility of Criminalizing the Failure to Rescue Others: A Consequentialist Approach in the Philosophy of Criminal Law

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 M.A., Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Master's student, Department of International Commercial and Economic Law, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

10.22081/phlq.2025.72068.1128

Abstract

The question of whether, and on what grounds, the failure to rescue others can be criminalized constitutes one of the fundamental challenges at the intersection of morality and criminal law. Can an individual be justly punished merely for refusing to provide assistance in situations where rendering aid entails no significant risk or cost? In light of rising individualism and the erosion of social bonds in modern societies, examining this question has acquired particular importance. Drawing on a utilitarian consequentialist framework and by assessing the principal arguments for and against such criminalization, this article demonstrates that imposing a legal duty to rescue as a criminal norm is morally unjustifiable and conflicts with the limiting principles of criminal law. Although failing to help others may be morally blameworthy, legally mandating assistance not only undermines the moral value of such conduct—whose worth depends on its voluntary nature—but also weakens individuals’ moral agency over time. Moreover, efforts to criminalize omissions to rescue generate the problem of indeterminate boundary‑drawing and a slippery slope, exposing society to the danger of expanding criminal liability in an unrestrained manner. Providing criminal‑law support for the moral duty to assist may ultimately erode that
very duty, transforming an internal virtue into an externally imposed and meaningless requirement, for the value of a moral virtue lies in its free adoption. In this sense, the law risks becoming a weapon against morality rather than its guardian. It appears, therefore, that the position opposing criminal‑law enforcement of the duty to rescue enjoys greater argumentative strength and theoretical coherence, while simultaneously safeguarding the boundaries of criminal law against unprincipled moralistic expansion.

Keywords

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Journal of Philosophy of Law
Volume 4, Issue 2
October 2025
Pages 276-257

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History

  • Receive Date: 07 June 2025
  • Revise Date: 28 August 2025
  • Accept Date: 09 June 2025

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