Critique of the Philosophical and Legal Foundations of Inherent Dignity in Contemporary Law

Document Type : Original Article

Author

PhD, Department of Public International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Human dignity is an innate and inherent value, in other words, the nature and human essence of human beings known as the basis for the birth of human rights. Inherent dignity, as a basis and principle, is the founder of the positivist international human rights law, which has been explained by the principle of inherent dignity and dignity under global and regional human rights instruments. Human dignity is the merit of every human being, despite the nature of man, is the basis for what a human being is. Since this principle is inherent and inalienable, the inherent dignity of man is interpreted as an absolute and inviolable right, not permissible to violate under any circumstances. The present study analyzes the mechanisms of the philosophical foundations of the principle of human dignity with the legal approach, by hiring a descriptive method and scrutiny in legislative decisions, as well as judicial ones, by comparing the mechanisms of the philosophical foundations according to the principle of human dignity with the legal approach. Given the metaphysical aspects of the inherent dignity of man, which still persist, the principle of human dignity opens up a valuable opportunity for a consistent critique and integration of this principle in legislative works, especially in judicial decisions. Although inherent dignity is a universal virtue and concept, its content depends to a large extent on the social, religious and traditional situations of specific societies. In this respect, the protection of inherent dignity under the rights of citizenship makes sense as a collective human right.

Keywords

References

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Journal of Philosophy of Law
Volume 3, Issue 1
June 2024
Pages 107-122

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History

  • Receive Date: 06 August 2024
  • Revise Date: 23 January 2025
  • Accept Date: 10 December 2024

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