A reflection on Habermas' legal discourse as legal logic

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Baqerul Uloom University

2 Associate professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Qom, Qom, Iran

10.22081/phlq.2024.67569.1040

Abstract

Legal logic is responsible for explaining the method of legal reasoning; And like general logic, it deals with the structure and materials of a direct or indirect legal or judicial argument. About whether law as a practical and normative science has a special logic or not? And what is the nature and principles of its special logic? Opinions have been raised. One of these views that has received more attention is Habermas' theory of legal discourse. In Habermas' theory of legal discourse, the process of legal norming is considered a method for the rationality of legal reasoning, along with formal and material logic. According to Habermas, modern law is a concept that still needs moral justification in order to measure the validity of its legal norms. Based on this, his legal discourse has a close connection with practical discourses including moral discourse. The purpose of the present research is to critically analyze the role of legal discourse in the logic of legal reasoning; To clarify whether this theory has the minimum necessary conditions as a logical legal device or not? The analysis of Habermas' discourse theory and his rationality criteria for moral and legal discourse shows that legal discourse does not have an independent identity from formal and material logic, and it cannot be given a separate logical dignity.The analysis of Habermas' discourse theory and his rationality criteria for moral and legal discourse shows that legal discourse does not have an independent identity from formal and material logic, and it cannot be given a separate logical dignity.

Keywords

Journal of Philosophy of Law

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 03 February 2024

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History

  • Receive Date: 15 October 2023
  • Revise Date: 13 January 2024
  • Accept Date: 03 February 2024

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