Ultimate-purpose Causality in legal Actions in the Light of neurobiology Findings, laboratory economics and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Qazvin Branch, Islamic Azad University, Qazvin, Iran

Abstract

The aim of the present research is to investigate the philosophical foundations of purposefulness and reason-oriented actions with legal consequences in the light of new findings of neuroscience, behavioral economics and contemporary philosophy of mind. In aim to identify these foundations, firstly, the concept of ultimate reason-oriented purpose in human behavior was analyzed from the perspective of philosophers (from ancient Greece till now) and contemporary neuroscientists. Then, the position of purposefulness and reason-oriented behavior with legal consequences has been investigated. The main question of the research is whether or not a human being performs all his voluntary actions (with an emphasis on legal actions) in a purposeful and reason-oriented way? The main hypothesis of the research is that human voluntary actions, including legal actions, are rationally oriented and due to the realization of a purpose. The findings of the research in the position of rejecting such hypothesis indicate that many voluntary human actions, including some actions with legal consequences, are emotional with limited rationality and the influence of environmental stimuli. Accordingly, there would not be judged by the example of a reasonable person with complete rationality in view law. The proposal of the research is to adopt an approach in which, besides the rational and ultimateistic aspects, the limited rationality of man in calculating and analyzing situations the emotional aspects and the nervous system, and the influence of environmental stimuli in the choice of decision, be paved and human beings never be judges through relying on rationality in all situations with an ideal standard. Especially in sudden events and lacking enough time that it is not possible for humans to process accurately and completely rational in calculating all kinds of possibilities and their consequences and referring to the reasons of their beliefs, preferences and information to choose the appropriate behavior.

Keywords

References

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Journal of Philosophy of Law
Volume 2, Issue 1 - Serial Number 3
March 2023
Pages 247-270

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History

  • Receive Date: 26 October 2023
  • Revise Date: 06 December 2023
  • Accept Date: 29 December 2023

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