Justification of the One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh Article of the Constitution Based on the Legal Theory of Ronald Dworkin

Authors

1 Assistant Professor, Mozaf Jurisprudence Department, Faculty of Social Sciences, Baqir Al-Olum University, Qom, Iran

2 Ph.D. in philosophy of law at Baqir al-Olum University, and Judge Judiciary, Qom, Iran, (Corresponding author)

10.22081/phlq.2023.73761

Abstract

Article 167 of the Constitution obliges the judge to refer to valid fatwas (judicial decrees) and religious sources if there is an insufficiency in the law. Some have posed basic ambiguities and questions regarding this article, which are based on a formalistic view of rights and the law. Legal formalism, which is based on the positivistic school of law and mechanical legal philosophy, considers formalistic reasoning  ـ based on the codified laws  ـ as the only correct method of legal reasoning, regardless of any external factors; and considers the rule of law dependent on the fulfillment of this method of reasoning. However, Professor Ronald Dworkin, as one of the most important philosophers of the modern law, expanded the concept of law and introduced principles as referents of law. Therefore, this article presents an interpretation of the rule of law, based on Dworkin’s theory, such that the formalistic problems of the 167th article of the Constitution are eliminated and it can be considered as a progressive solution in facing law’s insufficiencies.

Keywords

Journal of Philosophy of Law
Volume 1, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
February 2023
Pages 71-90

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History

  • Receive Date: 06 August 2022
  • Revise Date: 16 August 2022
  • Accept Date: 28 August 2022

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