Baqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Opportunities and Challenges of Digital Assets from a Public Law Perspective in the Legal Systems of Iran and CanadaOpportunities and Challenges of Digital Assets from a Public Law Perspective in the Legal Systems of Iran and Canada2677805810.22081/phlq.2025.72468.1139FANargesKhojandi JoziPhD., in Law and International Relations, Kish International Campus (University of Tehran), Kish, Iran.KheirolahParvinProfessor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran0000-0003-3529-1453NaderMirzadeh KoohshahiAssistant Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250730Using an analytical–comparative method and based on the examination of statutory texts, policy documents, and official reports, this study seeks to set out the theoretical foundations of public law in the field of digital governance, identify deficiencies in Iran’s legal system in comparison with the Canadian legal framework, and propose appropriate solutions. The findings indicate that despite the significant step taken through the 2024 Digital Assets Bylaw, the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran faces serious limitations in achieving effective governance of digital assets. These limitations arise from the lack of explicit upper‑level legislation, the absence of a designated regulatory authority, weak inter‑agency cooperation, and ambiguities within public law related to the creation and circulation of digital currency. In Canada, institutional coherence, clear and anticipatory legislation, accountability mechanisms, and the use of technology for continuous monitoring of digital markets have collectively contributed to establishing effective governance in several areas. Accordingly, reforming Iran’s public‑law framework in dealing with digital assets requires the enactment of comprehensive legislation grounded in public‑law theory, the establishment of a specialized regulatory authority, and enhanced cooperation among governmental, judicial, and security institutions. Moreover, the prudent adoption of comparative experiences from countries such as Canada can assist in designing a localized digital‑governance framework grounded in transparency, legitimacy, and accountability.Using an analytical–comparative method and based on the examination of statutory texts, policy documents, and official reports, this study seeks to set out the theoretical foundations of public law in the field of digital governance, identify deficiencies in Iran’s legal system in comparison with the Canadian legal framework, and propose appropriate solutions. The findings indicate that despite the significant step taken through the 2024 Digital Assets Bylaw, the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran faces serious limitations in achieving effective governance of digital assets. These limitations arise from the lack of explicit upper‑level legislation, the absence of a designated regulatory authority, weak inter‑agency cooperation, and ambiguities within public law related to the creation and circulation of digital currency. In Canada, institutional coherence, clear and anticipatory legislation, accountability mechanisms, and the use of technology for continuous monitoring of digital markets have collectively contributed to establishing effective governance in several areas. Accordingly, reforming Iran’s public‑law framework in dealing with digital assets requires the enactment of comprehensive legislation grounded in public‑law theory, the establishment of a specialized regulatory authority, and enhanced cooperation among governmental, judicial, and security institutions. Moreover, the prudent adoption of comparative experiences from countries such as Canada can assist in designing a localized digital‑governance framework grounded in transparency, legitimacy, and accountability.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_78058_6769d68e9d0ccbebf7424e76b41ae801.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Discourse Analysis of the Dominant Human Rights Paradigm in the International Law: Human Rights as a Civilizational and Ideological ConstructDiscourse Analysis of the Dominant Human Rights Paradigm in the International Law: Human Rights as a Civilizational and Ideological Construct58277939310.22081/phlq.2025.71694.1113FAFereshtehBahramipourPhD., Department of International Relations, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.AmirRezaeipanahPhD., Department of Political Science, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250426This study examines the dominant human rights paradigm in the international system as an ideology, a political‑social construct, and a function of global political economy. The central question addressed is how the prevailing human rights discourse in the international arena can be analyzed as an ideological and civilizational discourse, and what capacities exist within cultural‑Eastern counter‑discourses to challenge it. Employing the theoretical and methodological framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and semiotics, along with social constructivism and the historical sociology of international relations, the research analyzes the ways in which counter‑discourses emerging from the cultural East are represented and articulated. Within this framework, human rights are conceptualized as an ideology with two interrelated dimensions: an identity‑based dimension and a power‑based dimension. On the one hand, this ideology is rooted in a Western civilizational identity; on the other hand, it shapes distinct configurations of power relations at the global level. It is understood as the outcome of political‑social processes that take shape within the broader context of the global political economy. Accordingly, human rights are analyzed as an ideological discourse. Like other discourses, the dominant human rights discourse in <br />the international sphere is constructed through identity‑power relations. In a global environment characterized by contending narratives, the dominant human rights stream seeks to position its own narrative as the hegemonic one. Issues such as democracy and human rights have become particularly complex and contested in the post‑Cold War order. Internationally, human rights are often defined through Western–Eastern boundary‑making and grounded in Western concepts such as individualism, rationality, and liberalism. From a critical perspective—particularly in relation to Western identities and power structures—this discourse is seen as a mechanism for producing and reproducing forms of dominance. In this context, analyzing human rights as an ideological and civilizational phenomenon, especially from the perspective of non‑Western civilizations, cultures, and traditions, offers an opportunity to reconstruct and articulate alternative counter‑discourses.This study examines the dominant human rights paradigm in the international system as an ideology, a political‑social construct, and a function of global political economy. The central question addressed is how the prevailing human rights discourse in the international arena can be analyzed as an ideological and civilizational discourse, and what capacities exist within cultural‑Eastern counter‑discourses to challenge it. Employing the theoretical and methodological framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and semiotics, along with social constructivism and the historical sociology of international relations, the research analyzes the ways in which counter‑discourses emerging from the cultural East are represented and articulated. Within this framework, human rights are conceptualized as an ideology with two interrelated dimensions: an identity‑based dimension and a power‑based dimension. On the one hand, this ideology is rooted in a Western civilizational identity; on the other hand, it shapes distinct configurations of power relations at the global level. It is understood as the outcome of political‑social processes that take shape within the broader context of the global political economy. Accordingly, human rights are analyzed as an ideological discourse. Like other discourses, the dominant human rights discourse in <br />the international sphere is constructed through identity‑power relations. In a global environment characterized by contending narratives, the dominant human rights stream seeks to position its own narrative as the hegemonic one. Issues such as democracy and human rights have become particularly complex and contested in the post‑Cold War order. Internationally, human rights are often defined through Western–Eastern boundary‑making and grounded in Western concepts such as individualism, rationality, and liberalism. From a critical perspective—particularly in relation to Western identities and power structures—this discourse is seen as a mechanism for producing and reproducing forms of dominance. In this context, analyzing human rights as an ideological and civilizational phenomenon, especially from the perspective of non‑Western civilizations, cultures, and traditions, offers an opportunity to reconstruct and articulate alternative counter‑discourses.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79393_45fc8007d635d5039c5297ad52f6cc54.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Examining the Wife’s Right to Rescind the Marriage Contract as a Legal Remedy for the Husband’s Inability to Pay MaintenanceExamining the Wife’s Right to Rescind the Marriage Contract as a Legal Remedy for the Husband’s Inability to Pay Maintenance82597866410.22081/phlq.2025.73342.1156FAMohammad HasanGhasemzadehMaster's student, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.Journal Article20251106This article seeks to examine the possibility of rescission of marriage (*fasḵ*) by the wife where the husband is unable to provide maintenance/ alimony (*nafaqa*), by conducting an in‑depth analysis of the relevant jurisprudential and statutory foundations. The study argues that such a situation may be classified as either a breach of an implied condition or as *tadlīs* (fraudulent misrepresentation) within the marriage contract. The analysis begins by examining the nature and jurisprudential basis of maintenance, demonstrating that alimony or *nafaqa* encompasses all customary needs of the wife, including housing, clothing, food, medical care, and essential living expenses. The conditions governing the obligation to pay maintenance are then addressed, revealing two core prerequisites: the existence of a permanent marriage contract and the wife’s lawful cohabitation and compliance (*tamkīn*). Regarding available legal remedies, both criminal and civil mechanisms are examined. Under criminal law, a husband who, despite financial ability, intentionally refuses to pay maintenance is subject to sixth‑degree imprisonment pursuant to Article 53 of the Family Protection Act. Under civil law, the wife may claim maintenance before the family court and, in cases of persistent refusal and impossibility of enforcing the judgment, may request divorce under Article 1129 of the Civil Code. Given the complex and often protracted nature of divorce proceedings, this article contends that recognizing a right of rescission may serve as a more effective legal remedy. If the husband falsely portrays himself as financially capable at the time of contracting the marriage, and it later becomes evident that he lacked such ability from the outset, such conduct constitutes *tadlīs* or fradulant in marriage and, under Article 1128 of the Civil Code, gives rise to the wife’s right of rescission. Moreover, where financial incapacity arises after the marriage (supervening inability), this may be regarded as a breach of an implied essential condition regarding the husband’s financial capacity, thereby enabling the wife to rescind the marriage based on violation of an essential attribute of the contract. From a jurisprudential standpoint, the views of prominent jurists—including Shahid al‑Thānī, Fazel Hindi, and Imam Khomeini—are examined. These scholars have generally permitted the judge to compel payment of maintenance from the husband’s property where possible and to order his imprisonment where he lacks the ability but refuses to comply. However, in cases of absolute inability where no payment is possible, some jurists have explicitly recognized the wife’s right to rescind the marriage. This position, both logically and jurisprudentially, aligns with the Islamic principles of justice and the preservation of the woman’s dignity. Relying on Dr. Katouzian’s theory regarding the effects of rescission, the article further explains that rescission operates prospectively, and in cases where consummation has occurred, the wife’s right to the named dower (*mahr al‑musammā*) or gifted money remains intact. The study concludes that recognizing the wife’s right to rescind the marriage upon the husband’s inability to pay maintenance is not only compatible with jurisprudential principles and the Civil Code, but also constitutes an effective mechanism for protecting the wife and strengthening financial responsibility within marriage. This remedy, by reducing procedural complexities, facilitating judicial proceedings, and safeguarding the woman’s dignity, can help prevent repeated economic and psychological harm. Accordingly, the article recommends that legislators, drawing upon jurisprudential foundations and principles of social justice, consider incorporating this remedy into family‑law reforms, thereby ensuring both protection of the wife’s rights and preservation of family stability.This article seeks to examine the possibility of rescission of marriage (*fasḵ*) by the wife where the husband is unable to provide maintenance/ alimony (*nafaqa*), by conducting an in‑depth analysis of the relevant jurisprudential and statutory foundations. The study argues that such a situation may be classified as either a breach of an implied condition or as *tadlīs* (fraudulent misrepresentation) within the marriage contract. The analysis begins by examining the nature and jurisprudential basis of maintenance, demonstrating that alimony or *nafaqa* encompasses all customary needs of the wife, including housing, clothing, food, medical care, and essential living expenses. The conditions governing the obligation to pay maintenance are then addressed, revealing two core prerequisites: the existence of a permanent marriage contract and the wife’s lawful cohabitation and compliance (*tamkīn*). Regarding available legal remedies, both criminal and civil mechanisms are examined. Under criminal law, a husband who, despite financial ability, intentionally refuses to pay maintenance is subject to sixth‑degree imprisonment pursuant to Article 53 of the Family Protection Act. Under civil law, the wife may claim maintenance before the family court and, in cases of persistent refusal and impossibility of enforcing the judgment, may request divorce under Article 1129 of the Civil Code. Given the complex and often protracted nature of divorce proceedings, this article contends that recognizing a right of rescission may serve as a more effective legal remedy. If the husband falsely portrays himself as financially capable at the time of contracting the marriage, and it later becomes evident that he lacked such ability from the outset, such conduct constitutes *tadlīs* or fradulant in marriage and, under Article 1128 of the Civil Code, gives rise to the wife’s right of rescission. Moreover, where financial incapacity arises after the marriage (supervening inability), this may be regarded as a breach of an implied essential condition regarding the husband’s financial capacity, thereby enabling the wife to rescind the marriage based on violation of an essential attribute of the contract. From a jurisprudential standpoint, the views of prominent jurists—including Shahid al‑Thānī, Fazel Hindi, and Imam Khomeini—are examined. These scholars have generally permitted the judge to compel payment of maintenance from the husband’s property where possible and to order his imprisonment where he lacks the ability but refuses to comply. However, in cases of absolute inability where no payment is possible, some jurists have explicitly recognized the wife’s right to rescind the marriage. This position, both logically and jurisprudentially, aligns with the Islamic principles of justice and the preservation of the woman’s dignity. Relying on Dr. Katouzian’s theory regarding the effects of rescission, the article further explains that rescission operates prospectively, and in cases where consummation has occurred, the wife’s right to the named dower (*mahr al‑musammā*) or gifted money remains intact. The study concludes that recognizing the wife’s right to rescind the marriage upon the husband’s inability to pay maintenance is not only compatible with jurisprudential principles and the Civil Code, but also constitutes an effective mechanism for protecting the wife and strengthening financial responsibility within marriage. This remedy, by reducing procedural complexities, facilitating judicial proceedings, and safeguarding the woman’s dignity, can help prevent repeated economic and psychological harm. Accordingly, the article recommends that legislators, drawing upon jurisprudential foundations and principles of social justice, consider incorporating this remedy into family‑law reforms, thereby ensuring both protection of the wife’s rights and preservation of family stability.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_78664_e17bb5a7f87af79d071f60881c20f055.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923An Examination of the Violation of Iranian Economic Human Rights Resulting from U.S. Economic SanctionsAn Examination of the Violation of Iranian Economic Human Rights Resulting from U.S. Economic Sanctions110837939410.22081/phlq.2025.71782.1116FAMohammadAdami AbarqoeiPhD., Department of International Law, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, IranAliKafamiMaster's student, Department of International Law, Imam Sadeq University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250505In the contemporary international system, economic sanctions are increasingly employed as instruments of political and economic pressure against states. One of the most prominent examples of such policy is the extensive and continuous sanctions imposed by the United States of America on the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 Revolution. The present study aims to examine the economic dimensions of these sanctions and analyze their implications for the fundamental economic human rights of Iranian citizens. The principal question addressed in this research is whether the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran are compatible with the standards of economic human rights set forth in core human rights instruments—particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—or whether they should be regarded as violations thereof. This study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach, based on documentary and library research methods. Within this framework, the concept and status of economic sanctions in international law are first examined, followed by an analysis of the historical evolution of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Subsequently, the economic and social impacts of these sanctions are evaluated in light of international human rights instruments. The findings indicate that, despite the inclusion of humanitarian exemptions within the sanctions regime, these measures have, in practice, produced widespread economic and social consequences for Iranian citizens. Restricted access to the global financial and banking systems, reduced foreign investment, and disruption of trade exchanges have collectively led to weakened economic indicators and a decline in public welfare. Moreover, indirect obstacles to the supply of essential goods—such as medicines and medical equipment—have hindered the effective realization of rights including the right to health, the right to development, and the right to an adequate standard of living. Accordingly, the continuation of such sanctions appears to be inconsistent with international human rights obligations.In the contemporary international system, economic sanctions are increasingly employed as instruments of political and economic pressure against states. One of the most prominent examples of such policy is the extensive and continuous sanctions imposed by the United States of America on the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 Revolution. The present study aims to examine the economic dimensions of these sanctions and analyze their implications for the fundamental economic human rights of Iranian citizens. The principal question addressed in this research is whether the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran are compatible with the standards of economic human rights set forth in core human rights instruments—particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—or whether they should be regarded as violations thereof. This study adopts a descriptive–analytical approach, based on documentary and library research methods. Within this framework, the concept and status of economic sanctions in international law are first examined, followed by an analysis of the historical evolution of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Subsequently, the economic and social impacts of these sanctions are evaluated in light of international human rights instruments. The findings indicate that, despite the inclusion of humanitarian exemptions within the sanctions regime, these measures have, in practice, produced widespread economic and social consequences for Iranian citizens. Restricted access to the global financial and banking systems, reduced foreign investment, and disruption of trade exchanges have collectively led to weakened economic indicators and a decline in public welfare. Moreover, indirect obstacles to the supply of essential goods—such as medicines and medical equipment—have hindered the effective realization of rights including the right to health, the right to development, and the right to an adequate standard of living. Accordingly, the continuation of such sanctions appears to be inconsistent with international human rights obligations.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79394_4406b0aadc54b0913704eb45c10f420a.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Papillon: A Narrative of Human Resistance Against Gross Violations of Human Rights in the French Penal ColoniesPapillon: A Narrative of Human Resistance Against Gross Violations of Human Rights in the French Penal Colonies1261117785310.22081/phlq.2025.72070.1129FASimaHatamiPostdoctoral; PhD, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250607The interconnection between literature and human rights—grounded in a humanistic perspective and in the intrinsic value of the human being as such—has deep and enduring roots. *Papillon*, the celebrated novel by Henri Charrière, is not merely an adventurous tale of repeated escapes; it constitutes a powerful testament to grave and systematic violations of human rights within the French penal colonies of Guiana in the early twentieth century. Through a meticulous analysis of the experiences and observations of the protagonist, Papillon, this article examines multiple instances of violations of fundamental rights, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture and cruel punishments, the right to liberty and personal security, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, and the right to a fair trial. The novel vividly portrays inhumane living conditions, malnutrition, disease, relentless violence, and pervasive deprivations—conditions that trampled upon the inherent dignity of individuals. Simultaneously, this study highlights Papillon’s unyielding resistance and indomitable will, presenting him as both a central character and a symbolic embodiment of the human spirit’s struggle to preserve dignity and attain freedom. His actions are interpreted as an instinctive response to the systematic denial of fundamental rights. Ultimately, by juxtaposing these events with modern human rights standards—such as those reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—the article demonstrates that *Papillon* is not merely a historical narrative but a perpetual reminder of the imperative to safeguard human rights, as well as a warning against systems that shackle humanity and subject human dignity to mockery and contempt. May human beings honor the humanity of one another, and refrain from cruelty toward their fellow human beings.The interconnection between literature and human rights—grounded in a humanistic perspective and in the intrinsic value of the human being as such—has deep and enduring roots. *Papillon*, the celebrated novel by Henri Charrière, is not merely an adventurous tale of repeated escapes; it constitutes a powerful testament to grave and systematic violations of human rights within the French penal colonies of Guiana in the early twentieth century. Through a meticulous analysis of the experiences and observations of the protagonist, Papillon, this article examines multiple instances of violations of fundamental rights, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture and cruel punishments, the right to liberty and personal security, the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, and the right to a fair trial. The novel vividly portrays inhumane living conditions, malnutrition, disease, relentless violence, and pervasive deprivations—conditions that trampled upon the inherent dignity of individuals. Simultaneously, this study highlights Papillon’s unyielding resistance and indomitable will, presenting him as both a central character and a symbolic embodiment of the human spirit’s struggle to preserve dignity and attain freedom. His actions are interpreted as an instinctive response to the systematic denial of fundamental rights. Ultimately, by juxtaposing these events with modern human rights standards—such as those reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—the article demonstrates that *Papillon* is not merely a historical narrative but a perpetual reminder of the imperative to safeguard human rights, as well as a warning against systems that shackle humanity and subject human dignity to mockery and contempt. May human beings honor the humanity of one another, and refrain from cruelty toward their fellow human beings.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_77853_312e349e733e06740e283b0f77a063b9.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923A Genealogy of the Concept of Law and
the Impossibility of Religious and Philosophical Neutrality in Its ContentA Genealogy of the Concept of Law and
the Impossibility of Religious and Philosophical Neutrality in Its Content1541277939510.22081/phlq.2025.71923.1120FAMohammad AbdolsalehShahnoosh ForooshaniAssistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250524This study, by examining the documents and discourses related to the concept of law before and after the Constitutional Revolution, demonstrates that the concept of “law” (qānūn) in contemporary Iran is a modern construct, emerging from the political and social dynamics of Iranian society during and after the Qajar era. The meaning and content of law،both have been shaped by philosophical, ethical, religious, and theological beliefs; hence, the neutrality of law in these respects is impossible. The concept of law must therefore be understood as a product of the intellectual efforts of modern Iranian thinkers. Contrary to the impression derived from the statements of some contemporary scholars, law in modern Iranian thought does not refer to a trans‑historical or universal concept. Rather, it refers to a construct rooted in Iran’s specific historical, social, political, and cultural order. Thus, the influence of the philosophical, ethical, religious, and political beliefs of Qajar‑period intellectuals must be taken into account in the formation of this concept and the semantic articulation of the term qānūn itself. What further substantiates this claim is that normative propositions—those containing ought or ought not, such as moral and legal propositions—cannot, by their very nature, be neutral in philosophical, religious, historical, social, or cultural terms. It is precisely these dimensions that determine the substance of normative content. Contrary to the instruction of Moshir al‑Dowleh regarding the construction of law, it is philosophically impossible for law to be neutral in religious or moral respects. In other words, the very attempt to render the content of law neutral constitutes, in itself, a departure from neutrality.This study, by examining the documents and discourses related to the concept of law before and after the Constitutional Revolution, demonstrates that the concept of “law” (qānūn) in contemporary Iran is a modern construct, emerging from the political and social dynamics of Iranian society during and after the Qajar era. The meaning and content of law،both have been shaped by philosophical, ethical, religious, and theological beliefs; hence, the neutrality of law in these respects is impossible. The concept of law must therefore be understood as a product of the intellectual efforts of modern Iranian thinkers. Contrary to the impression derived from the statements of some contemporary scholars, law in modern Iranian thought does not refer to a trans‑historical or universal concept. Rather, it refers to a construct rooted in Iran’s specific historical, social, political, and cultural order. Thus, the influence of the philosophical, ethical, religious, and political beliefs of Qajar‑period intellectuals must be taken into account in the formation of this concept and the semantic articulation of the term qānūn itself. What further substantiates this claim is that normative propositions—those containing ought or ought not, such as moral and legal propositions—cannot, by their very nature, be neutral in philosophical, religious, historical, social, or cultural terms. It is precisely these dimensions that determine the substance of normative content. Contrary to the instruction of Moshir al‑Dowleh regarding the construction of law, it is philosophically impossible for law to be neutral in religious or moral respects. In other words, the very attempt to render the content of law neutral constitutes, in itself, a departure from neutrality.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79395_b3a565c7ce2ab81efc1d1cc7244a8ca0.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923The Political Economy of Constitutional Rules:
An Examination of the Function of Constitutional Economics in Legal StudiesThe Political Economy of Constitutional Rules:
An Examination of the Function of Constitutional Economics in Legal Studies1801557939910.22081/phlq.2025.72053.1127FASeyed EhsanRafiei AlaviAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Law, Baqir al Oloum University, Qom, Iran.AmirHosseinBamati TousiPhD., Candidate, Department of Public Law, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, IranJournal Article20250603Employing a descriptive–analytical method, this study seeks to clarify the position of the political economy of constitutional rules and the necessity of employing this approach in legal studies. It addresses the question of what role the political economy of constitutional rules plays within the discipline of law and how this approach may contribute to a much deeper understanding of legal structures and institutions. As an academic field, the political economy of constitutional rules, owing to its interdisciplinary character, provides enriching epistemic perspectives for legal scholars. The findings of this research indicate that this approach offers valuable contributions to legal scholarship across three domains: positive, normative, and interpretive. The positive dimension explains how laws are formed and how actors respond to them; the normative dimension evaluates laws according to value‑based criteria; and the interpretive dimension concerns the interpretation and clarification of the meaning of legal rules. The principal function of this approach lies in providing guidance for fundamental institutional change and for the reform and adjustment of existing rules in order to improve the “rules of the game.” This study further explains how the political economy of constitutional rules, through its analytical tools, is capable of identifying and predicting the behavioral consequences arising from the incentive structures embedded within constitutional rules. The approach provides a framework for normative evaluation and may play an effective and strategic role in the revision and reform of constitutional rules. It also offers a perspective through which the operation and consequences of constitutional rules may be better understood, enabling a clearer interpretation of constitutional provisions—an interpretation that may ultimately contribute to improving the institutional conditions governing political and economic spheres.The political economy of constitutional rules concerns the application of the analytical tools and methods of economics to the evaluation of fundamental rules within which legal structures and social institutions are organized and within whose framework social actions take place. This approach occupies a distinctive position at the intersection <br />of economics, political science, and law, and constitutes an important component of interdisciplinary studies. It also provides significant insights into issues such as public finance and economic policymaking. This article therefore seeks to explain and elaborate the importance of studying this approach within legal scholarship and to clearly delineate its functions and contributions to the field of law.Employing a descriptive–analytical method, this study seeks to clarify the position of the political economy of constitutional rules and the necessity of employing this approach in legal studies. It addresses the question of what role the political economy of constitutional rules plays within the discipline of law and how this approach may contribute to a much deeper understanding of legal structures and institutions. As an academic field, the political economy of constitutional rules, owing to its interdisciplinary character, provides enriching epistemic perspectives for legal scholars. The findings of this research indicate that this approach offers valuable contributions to legal scholarship across three domains: positive, normative, and interpretive. The positive dimension explains how laws are formed and how actors respond to them; the normative dimension evaluates laws according to value‑based criteria; and the interpretive dimension concerns the interpretation and clarification of the meaning of legal rules. The principal function of this approach lies in providing guidance for fundamental institutional change and for the reform and adjustment of existing rules in order to improve the “rules of the game.” This study further explains how the political economy of constitutional rules, through its analytical tools, is capable of identifying and predicting the behavioral consequences arising from the incentive structures embedded within constitutional rules. The approach provides a framework for normative evaluation and may play an effective and strategic role in the revision and reform of constitutional rules. It also offers a perspective through which the operation and consequences of constitutional rules may be better understood, enabling a clearer interpretation of constitutional provisions—an interpretation that may ultimately contribute to improving the institutional conditions governing political and economic spheres.The political economy of constitutional rules concerns the application of the analytical tools and methods of economics to the evaluation of fundamental rules within which legal structures and social institutions are organized and within whose framework social actions take place. This approach occupies a distinctive position at the intersection <br />of economics, political science, and law, and constitutes an important component of interdisciplinary studies. It also provides significant insights into issues such as public finance and economic policymaking. This article therefore seeks to explain and elaborate the importance of studying this approach within legal scholarship and to clearly delineate its functions and contributions to the field of law.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79399_c3949d1cd3f2f42ec4b3a938e1d7116c.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Ethical and Functional Foundations of Human Rights in the Eastern ApproachEthical and Functional Foundations of Human Rights in the Eastern Approach1981817938710.22081/phlq.2025.71354.1103FATahereh SadatNaeimiDepartment of Fiqh and Law, Is.C. (Khorasgan), Islamic Azad University, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20250311This study aims to identify the ethical and functional foundations of human rights within the framework of the Eastern approach by analyzing a set of perspectives, philosophies, and intellectual traditions that have developed in the East, particularly in the Asian continent. By identifying a range of ethical foundations through thematic structuring of sociological and legal sources, the present research employs thematic analysis as one of the widely used methods in qualitative research. Detailed datasets related to the ethical and functional foundations of human rights within the Eastern approach were extracted, and key patterns were vividly identified. The findings of the study indicate that the ethical foundations of human rights in the Eastern approach are primarily grounded in ethical and religious philosophies such as Confucian philosophy, Indian philosophical traditions, Buddhism, and Islamic human rights. These foundations possess both distinctive and, at times, overlapping features, which are analytically examined in this article. At the same time, the implementation and practical realization of each of these foundations encounter various challenges, including cultural differences, the influence of governmental policies, and social and economic inequalities. The practical analysis of these foundations requires careful consideration of cultural and historical differences within the Eastern approach <br />so that, through an understanding of such differences, the existing challenges can be effectively addressed and resolved. Human rights, as one of the fundamental concepts of the contemporary world, encompass a set of inherent, inalienable, and non-derogable rights and freedoms belonging to all human beings. These rights exist regardless of gender, religion, race, language, or nationality and are characterized by features such as inviolability, legal enforceability, protection and guarantee, universality, and inherent nature. Given that the Eastern approach to human rights embodies multidimensional perspectives shaped by culture, religious thought, history, political considerations, and social conditions across different periods, the ethical and functional foundations of human rights within this framework require careful and meticulous examination and reflection upon cultural and historical differences. Taking into account such diversity and complexity enables this approach to provide a more comprehensive and contextually appropriate interpretation of human rights. Furthermore, the distinctive orientation of the Eastern approach toward human rights—based on the aforementioned characteristics—represents a noteworthy perspective. One of its prominent features is the emphasis on community and social responsibilities. In contrast to the Western approach to human rights, which places greater emphasis on humanism and individualism, the Eastern perspective seeks to achieve a balanced outcome between the individual and the collective, thereby offering a more effective conceptual framework for the analysis of human rights.This study aims to identify the ethical and functional foundations of human rights within the framework of the Eastern approach by analyzing a set of perspectives, philosophies, and intellectual traditions that have developed in the East, particularly in the Asian continent. By identifying a range of ethical foundations through thematic structuring of sociological and legal sources, the present research employs thematic analysis as one of the widely used methods in qualitative research. Detailed datasets related to the ethical and functional foundations of human rights within the Eastern approach were extracted, and key patterns were vividly identified. The findings of the study indicate that the ethical foundations of human rights in the Eastern approach are primarily grounded in ethical and religious philosophies such as Confucian philosophy, Indian philosophical traditions, Buddhism, and Islamic human rights. These foundations possess both distinctive and, at times, overlapping features, which are analytically examined in this article. At the same time, the implementation and practical realization of each of these foundations encounter various challenges, including cultural differences, the influence of governmental policies, and social and economic inequalities. The practical analysis of these foundations requires careful consideration of cultural and historical differences within the Eastern approach <br />so that, through an understanding of such differences, the existing challenges can be effectively addressed and resolved. Human rights, as one of the fundamental concepts of the contemporary world, encompass a set of inherent, inalienable, and non-derogable rights and freedoms belonging to all human beings. These rights exist regardless of gender, religion, race, language, or nationality and are characterized by features such as inviolability, legal enforceability, protection and guarantee, universality, and inherent nature. Given that the Eastern approach to human rights embodies multidimensional perspectives shaped by culture, religious thought, history, political considerations, and social conditions across different periods, the ethical and functional foundations of human rights within this framework require careful and meticulous examination and reflection upon cultural and historical differences. Taking into account such diversity and complexity enables this approach to provide a more comprehensive and contextually appropriate interpretation of human rights. Furthermore, the distinctive orientation of the Eastern approach toward human rights—based on the aforementioned characteristics—represents a noteworthy perspective. One of its prominent features is the emphasis on community and social responsibilities. In contrast to the Western approach to human rights, which places greater emphasis on humanism and individualism, the Eastern perspective seeks to achieve a balanced outcome between the individual and the collective, thereby offering a more effective conceptual framework for the analysis of human rights.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79387_c97792ceae5ffe76d4668f45c676b113.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923The Challenge of Inefficiency and Limited Effectiveness of International Organizations in
the Protection of Human RightsThe Challenge of Inefficiency and Limited Effectiveness of International Organizations in
the Protection of Human Rights2181997938510.22081/phlq.2025.71327.1099FAMarvehKashiriPhD., Lamee Gorgani Institute of Higher Education, Gorgan, IranMortezaAbdiPhD., International Office of the Center for Lawyers, Official Experts and Family Consultants of the Judiciary, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250516The protection of human rights is often a central component of peace agreements and post‑conflict settlements. Human rights NGOs, which have long worked to secure such protections, are generally expected to play a primary role in ensuring the implementation of human rights obligations. However, the very landscape of political transition that creates opportunities for strengthening human rights enforcement also generates significant difficulties for domestic human rights NGOs. Following a peace agreement, patterns of conflict, existing human rights mechanisms, and the overall configuration of human rights actors undergo substantial transformation. These shifts can create challenges for NGOs in terms of mission definition, prioritization, funding, staffing, and their relationships with other groups. This article describes and analyzes the ways in which transitional contexts influence domestic human rights NGOs, drawing on examples from various countries. One major source of inefficiency within these organizations is the lack of synergy and coordination between domestic and international institutions. Many such NGOs depend heavily on foreign funding and political support; because these resources often come from external states or international bodies, political pressures and conflicting interests can undermine their independence and operational effectiveness. Another challenge stems from divergences between Islamic conceptions of human rights and the international or global interpretations embedded in universal human rights standards. Many Islamic international NGOs, particularly in Eastern and Muslim-majority societies, encounter concepts and norms that may not align with the cultural or legal understandings prevalent in their <br />own countries. As a result, these organizations may find themselves unable to operate effectively within international frameworks, agreements, and conventions, as differing interpretations of human rights can restrict their capacity to adopt or implement global standards. Furthermore, media‑related and communication challenges significantly impede the effectiveness of these organizations. Many lack the resources required for global media engagement or for producing influential public communications. This shortage limits their ability to disseminate messages effectively at the international level. Overall, despite considerable efforts to promote and safeguard Islamic human rights, these organizations face substantial obstacles—including internal disagreements, tensions with global standards, financial constraints, legal limitations, and communication deficiencies—that hinder their ability to fully achieve their objectives.The protection of human rights is often a central component of peace agreements and post‑conflict settlements. Human rights NGOs, which have long worked to secure such protections, are generally expected to play a primary role in ensuring the implementation of human rights obligations. However, the very landscape of political transition that creates opportunities for strengthening human rights enforcement also generates significant difficulties for domestic human rights NGOs. Following a peace agreement, patterns of conflict, existing human rights mechanisms, and the overall configuration of human rights actors undergo substantial transformation. These shifts can create challenges for NGOs in terms of mission definition, prioritization, funding, staffing, and their relationships with other groups. This article describes and analyzes the ways in which transitional contexts influence domestic human rights NGOs, drawing on examples from various countries. One major source of inefficiency within these organizations is the lack of synergy and coordination between domestic and international institutions. Many such NGOs depend heavily on foreign funding and political support; because these resources often come from external states or international bodies, political pressures and conflicting interests can undermine their independence and operational effectiveness. Another challenge stems from divergences between Islamic conceptions of human rights and the international or global interpretations embedded in universal human rights standards. Many Islamic international NGOs, particularly in Eastern and Muslim-majority societies, encounter concepts and norms that may not align with the cultural or legal understandings prevalent in their <br />own countries. As a result, these organizations may find themselves unable to operate effectively within international frameworks, agreements, and conventions, as differing interpretations of human rights can restrict their capacity to adopt or implement global standards. Furthermore, media‑related and communication challenges significantly impede the effectiveness of these organizations. Many lack the resources required for global media engagement or for producing influential public communications. This shortage limits their ability to disseminate messages effectively at the international level. Overall, despite considerable efforts to promote and safeguard Islamic human rights, these organizations face substantial obstacles—including internal disagreements, tensions with global standards, financial constraints, legal limitations, and communication deficiencies—that hinder their ability to fully achieve their objectives.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79385_169df8ca50d00a91a075ce91ba547058.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Economic Approaches to Human RightsEconomic Approaches to Human Rights2362197938910.22081/phlq.2025.71570.1109FAHoseinMahdihadiAssistant Professor, Payam Noor University, Tehran, IranFarahnazBahaminMaster of Law, Department of Law, Ur.C., Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran.Journal Article20250415The present study aims to examine the role of economic approaches to human rights in achieving good governance, political stability, and international security. This research is applied in terms of purpose and qualitative in nature, employing a descriptive–analytical method based on documentary and survey data. The findings indicate that, given the direct relationship between violations of economic human rights, poverty, and insecurity, attention to these approaches not only reduces human rights violations but also functions as a necessary precondition for attaining domestic and international stability. Poverty and inequality arising from the violation of economic human rights pose a serious threat to global peace and security—an issue that the United Nations Charter also underscores by emphasizing the responsibilities of states and international institutions in addressing these challenges. Improving the condition of economic human rights can reduce insecurity <br />and strengthen good governance within a society. This improvement is among the most significant factors in reducing poverty and mitigating various forms of inequality, particularly economic inequality among individuals and social groups. Consideration of economic approaches to human rights, in addition to diminishing human rights violations, helps political leaders recognize that national stability, social calm, and the attainment of good governance are achievable through the realization of economic human rights.The present study aims to examine the role of economic approaches to human rights in achieving good governance, political stability, and international security. This research is applied in terms of purpose and qualitative in nature, employing a descriptive–analytical method based on documentary and survey data. The findings indicate that, given the direct relationship between violations of economic human rights, poverty, and insecurity, attention to these approaches not only reduces human rights violations but also functions as a necessary precondition for attaining domestic and international stability. Poverty and inequality arising from the violation of economic human rights pose a serious threat to global peace and security—an issue that the United Nations Charter also underscores by emphasizing the responsibilities of states and international institutions in addressing these challenges. Improving the condition of economic human rights can reduce insecurity <br />and strengthen good governance within a society. This improvement is among the most significant factors in reducing poverty and mitigating various forms of inequality, particularly economic inequality among individuals and social groups. Consideration of economic approaches to human rights, in addition to diminishing human rights violations, helps political leaders recognize that national stability, social calm, and the attainment of good governance are achievable through the realization of economic human rights.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79389_f75a7a0786a60e11570010efbacb252d.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Preservation of Cultural Identity and Women’s Human Rights in the East: A Critique of Western Feminism and a Reflection on the Localist ApproachPreservation of Cultural Identity and Women’s Human Rights in the East: A Critique of Western Feminism and a Reflection on the Localist Approach2562377939010.22081/phlq.2025.71594.1110FASomayyeHajiEsmaeiliAssistant Professor, Research Institute for Women and Family, Qom, IranJournal Article20250418The purpose of this article is to examine and critique the Western feminist approach and the dominant discourse of universal human rights in addressing the issue of Eastern women. This study seeks to demonstrate how the universalization of concepts such as freedom, equality, and emancipation often fails to align with the cultural, religious, and social contexts of Eastern societies. Emphasizing a localist approach, the possibility of integrating gender justice with the preservation of women’s cultural identity in societies such as Iran, Iraq, and Gaza is also explored. This research adopts a qualitative method, utilizing the theoretical framework of postcolonial feminism. In the conceptual section, the views of Edward Said in Orientalism, Gayatri Spivak and Chandra Mohanty in postcolonial feminism, and Samuel Huntington in the “Clash of Civilizations” theory are employed. The research method is based on critical discourse analysis and comparative studies, and, to provide a more concrete examination of the subject, three case studies on the situation of women in Iran, Iraq, and Gaza are analyzed. The findings indicate that the prevailing discourse of Western feminism often overlooks the experiences and cultural backgrounds of Eastern women, instead defining them within universalized paradigms. In some instances, this leads to the reproduction of an Orientalist perspective towards Eastern women. Furthermore, analysis of the case studies reveals the emergence of cultural resistance against imposed global models in these societies, resulting in the rise of indigenous interpretations of women’s rights, which seek to balance cultural values and demands for gender justice. According to the findings, effective realization of women’s rights in Eastern societies requires an approach attentive to cultural diversity and local contexts. Mere reliance on universal Western feminist models cannot address the cultural and social complexities of these societies. Therefore, the <br />article emphasizes the need to reassess certain international human rights documents and discourses, to facilitate the acceptance of diverse and indigenous approaches for realizing gender justice, and to establish a balanced connection between women’s rights and the preservation of cultural identity.The purpose of this article is to examine and critique the Western feminist approach and the dominant discourse of universal human rights in addressing the issue of Eastern women. This study seeks to demonstrate how the universalization of concepts such as freedom, equality, and emancipation often fails to align with the cultural, religious, and social contexts of Eastern societies. Emphasizing a localist approach, the possibility of integrating gender justice with the preservation of women’s cultural identity in societies such as Iran, Iraq, and Gaza is also explored. This research adopts a qualitative method, utilizing the theoretical framework of postcolonial feminism. In the conceptual section, the views of Edward Said in Orientalism, Gayatri Spivak and Chandra Mohanty in postcolonial feminism, and Samuel Huntington in the “Clash of Civilizations” theory are employed. The research method is based on critical discourse analysis and comparative studies, and, to provide a more concrete examination of the subject, three case studies on the situation of women in Iran, Iraq, and Gaza are analyzed. The findings indicate that the prevailing discourse of Western feminism often overlooks the experiences and cultural backgrounds of Eastern women, instead defining them within universalized paradigms. In some instances, this leads to the reproduction of an Orientalist perspective towards Eastern women. Furthermore, analysis of the case studies reveals the emergence of cultural resistance against imposed global models in these societies, resulting in the rise of indigenous interpretations of women’s rights, which seek to balance cultural values and demands for gender justice. According to the findings, effective realization of women’s rights in Eastern societies requires an approach attentive to cultural diversity and local contexts. Mere reliance on universal Western feminist models cannot address the cultural and social complexities of these societies. Therefore, the <br />article emphasizes the need to reassess certain international human rights documents and discourses, to facilitate the acceptance of diverse and indigenous approaches for realizing gender justice, and to establish a balanced connection between women’s rights and the preservation of cultural identity.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_79390_4de5de4a98a00aed3daa22aad56a4baf.pdfBaqir al-Olum UniversityJournal of Philosophy of Law2980-87154220250923Feasibility of Criminalizing the Failure to Rescue Others: A Consequentialist Approach in
the Philosophy of Criminal LawFeasibility of Criminalizing the Failure to Rescue Others: A Consequentialist Approach in
the Philosophy of Criminal Law2762577773910.22081/phlq.2025.72068.1128FAMohammad AliBeheshti MoghaddamM.A., Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranSeyed AliSajjadiMaster's student, Department of International Commercial and Economic Law, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250607The question of whether, and on what grounds, the failure to rescue others can be criminalized constitutes one of the fundamental challenges at the intersection of morality and criminal law. Can an individual be justly punished merely for refusing to provide assistance in situations where rendering aid entails no significant risk or cost? In light of rising individualism and the erosion of social bonds in modern societies, examining this question has acquired particular importance. Drawing on a utilitarian consequentialist framework and by assessing the principal arguments for and against such criminalization, this article demonstrates that imposing a legal duty to rescue as a criminal norm is morally unjustifiable and conflicts with the limiting principles of criminal law. Although failing to help others may be morally blameworthy, legally mandating assistance not only undermines the moral value of such conduct—whose worth depends on its voluntary nature—but also weakens individuals’ moral agency over time. Moreover, efforts to criminalize omissions to rescue generate the problem of indeterminate boundary‑drawing and a slippery slope, exposing society to the danger of expanding criminal liability in an unrestrained manner. Providing criminal‑law support for the moral duty to assist may ultimately erode that <br />very duty, transforming an internal virtue into an externally imposed and meaningless requirement, for the value of a moral virtue lies in its free adoption. In this sense, the law risks becoming a weapon against morality rather than its guardian. It appears, therefore, that the position opposing criminal‑law enforcement of the duty to rescue enjoys greater argumentative strength and theoretical coherence, while simultaneously safeguarding the boundaries of criminal law against unprincipled moralistic expansion.The question of whether, and on what grounds, the failure to rescue others can be criminalized constitutes one of the fundamental challenges at the intersection of morality and criminal law. Can an individual be justly punished merely for refusing to provide assistance in situations where rendering aid entails no significant risk or cost? In light of rising individualism and the erosion of social bonds in modern societies, examining this question has acquired particular importance. Drawing on a utilitarian consequentialist framework and by assessing the principal arguments for and against such criminalization, this article demonstrates that imposing a legal duty to rescue as a criminal norm is morally unjustifiable and conflicts with the limiting principles of criminal law. Although failing to help others may be morally blameworthy, legally mandating assistance not only undermines the moral value of such conduct—whose worth depends on its voluntary nature—but also weakens individuals’ moral agency over time. Moreover, efforts to criminalize omissions to rescue generate the problem of indeterminate boundary‑drawing and a slippery slope, exposing society to the danger of expanding criminal liability in an unrestrained manner. Providing criminal‑law support for the moral duty to assist may ultimately erode that <br />very duty, transforming an internal virtue into an externally imposed and meaningless requirement, for the value of a moral virtue lies in its free adoption. In this sense, the law risks becoming a weapon against morality rather than its guardian. It appears, therefore, that the position opposing criminal‑law enforcement of the duty to rescue enjoys greater argumentative strength and theoretical coherence, while simultaneously safeguarding the boundaries of criminal law against unprincipled moralistic expansion.https://phlq.bou.ac.ir/article_77739_682bf2116a75175694a28b9cbecab1d6.pdf